Is Absolute Accountability a Good Thing?

In the blog that I posted on 7-14-11, Cutting Off Your Nose to Spite Your Face, I cited George Friedman’s article, Libya and the Problem with the Hague. He argues that, when atrocities are taking place, deciding how to respond can present a difficult moral dilemma. Is it better to grant amnesty to the perpetrator in return for an end to the violence or to pursue the perpetrator until he can be held accountable for all of crimes he has committed, even though this means more innocent people will be harmed before this occurs?  

In South Africa, this dilemma was resolved in favor of amnesty. A negotiated political process provided for the transfer of governmental authority to black South Africans, but a part of the agreement provided for a non-judicial truth commission to review events and for prosecutions to be severely limited.

Friedman asks if that South African agreement were entered today, “with the [International Criminal Court] in place and ‘Spanish magistrates’ loose, how likely would it be that the white government would be willing to make the political concessions needed to transfer power? Would an agreement among the South Africans have trumped the jurisdiction of the ICC or another forum? Without the absolute certainty of amnesty, would the white leadership have capitulated?”

Today, International Criminal Court indictments may be used to legitimize bombing campaigns by Western countries as humanitarian intervention, but they leave little room for negotiated settlements. Friedman asserts that an independent judiciary that is impervious to political realities can create catastrophes in the name of justice. He asks, “If it means that thousands must die because the need to punish the guilty is an absolute, is that justice? Just as important, does it serve to alleviate or exacerbate human suffering?”

In his article, Friedman shares a poignant, personal application of this moral dilemma:

Consider a hypothetical. Assume that in the summer of 1944, Adolph Hitler had offered to capitulate to the allies if they would grant him amnesty. Giving Hitler amnesty would have been monstrous, but at the same time, it would have saved a year of war and a year of the holocaust. From a personal point of view, the summer of 1944 was when deportation of Hungarian Jews was at its height. Most of my family died that fall and winter. Would leaving Hitler alive been worth it to my family and millions of others on all sides?

In the case a tyrannical dictator, granting amnesty means the tyrant escapes punishment in return for his abdication and the end of atrocities. It allows people who would have died to live. On the other hand, we believe that punishment is necessary to deter others from doing the same. Friedman argues that this is a false hope.

Men like Gadhafi, Milosevic, Karadzic and Hitler grow accustomed to living with death long before they take power. . . . Such leaders constitute an odd, paradoxical category of men who will risk everything for power, and then guard their lives and power with everything. It is hard to frighten them, and harder still to have them abandon power without guarantees.

Friedman observes that it is those who seek absolute accountability who regard themselves as committed to humanitarianism. He sees this as a misconception. Are there times when forgiving tyrants is the better course of action?